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REFLECTIONS OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN 
MULTICULTURAL SETTINGS* 
 
VICTORIA CAMARERO SUÁREZ 
F. JAVIER ZAMORA CABOT 
Universitat Jaume I, Castellón 
 
SUMMARY: I. INTRODUCTION. II. PLURALISM IN 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW. III. PLURALISM IN EXTERNAL 
LEGAL TRANSACTION REGULATIONS. 1. State regulations. 
2. International regulations. IV. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The authors of this paper have carried out an extensive, thoroughly documented 
initial study (published elsewhere) on a major aspect of the relation between legal 
pluralism and multiculturality, namely conflict resolution channels – particularly 
Islamic – that offer an alternative to the legal processes in Western countries, focusing 
on the USA, Canada and the United Kingdom1. During the exacting preparation of this 
study, we encountered many interesting questions related to our research subject that for 
various reasons we considered should not be included. In this paper, we deal with some 
of these issues, qualified in the title as ‘reflections’, which we believe could provide 
new insight into knowledge of legal pluralism today in Western societies, which are 
somewhat arrogantly held up as advanced, particularly in terms of the development and 
experience of human rights. 
                                                 
* This study was carried out as part of the Proyecto Consolider–Ingenio 2010, HURI-AGE-THE AGE OF 
RIGHTS. CSD2008-0007. 
1 “Pluralismo y multiculturalidad: Tribunal Arbitral Musulmán y Consejos Islámicos (“Sharia Courts”) 
en el Reino Unido”, forthcoming in ADEE, 2012. 
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 An initial line of thoughts would lead us to verify the current concept of legal 
pluralism that – doctrinal disputes aside and from a purely intuitive approach for our 
present purposes – we might define as the existence of a multitude of autonomous 
sources of regulation and of conflict resolution channels that fall outside those of the 
state. It is, in any event, a widely studied phenomenon on which legal sociology opened 
up pioneering debate, for example, following the germinal work of E. Ehrich and his 
notion of “living law”2. We also explore very recent approaches that show how the 
spontaneous submission to a regulatory pluriverse originating from all manner of social 
and economic entities and actors can arise in people’s ordinary lives. This is the case, 
for example, of the renowned author, W. Twining, who, with a certain sense of humour, 
reminds us that even his laziest students are able to recognise, in a two-day practical 
session, more than one hundred regulatory systems they have been compelled to 
observe in the normal course of their lives over that short space of time3. If, moreover, 
                                                 
2 See for example, D. Nelken, “Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law and Plural Legalities”, Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law, vol. 9, 2008, pp. 443-471; A. Cebeira Moro, “Pluralismo jurídico y Derecho Vivo: la concepción 
sociológica de Ehrlich”, in ¿Hacia un paradigma cosmopolita del derecho?: Pluralismo jurídico, 
ciudadania y resolución de conflictos, N. Belloso and A. de Julios-Campuzano, (eds.), Madrid, Dykinson, 
2008, pp. 79-98 and G. Teubner, “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society”, in Global 
Law Without a State, G. Teubner, (ed.), Darthmouth, Brookfield, 1997, pp. 3-28. On more recent 
doctrine, see, in general, among others: P. S. Berman, “The New Legal Pluralism”, The Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science, vol. 5, 2009, pp. 225-42; M. Croce, “Does Legal Institutionalism Rule Out Legal 
Pluralism? Schmitt’s Institutional Theory and the Problem of the Concrete Order”, Utrecht Law Review, 
vol. 7, 2011, pp. 42-59; G. M. Ferreira-Snyman, “The Harmonisation of Laws Within the African Union 
and the Viability of Legal Pluralism as an Alternative”, Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law, vol. 
73, 2010, pp. 608-628; K. Günther, “Legal Pluralism or Uniform Concept of Law?”, NoFo, 5-IV-2008, 21 
pp.; E. Melisaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism, Ashgate Press, 2009; 
R. Michaels, “Global Legal Pluralism”, Duke Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 185, 26 pp.; 
J-S Bergé, “Implementation of the Law, Global Legal Pluralism and Hierarchy of Norms”, European 
Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 4, 2011, pp. 241-263; B. Z. Tamanaha, “The Rule of Law and Legal 
Pluralism in Development”, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Washington University, in St. Louis, 
School of Law, Paper No. 11-07-01, July 2011, 26 pp.; W. Twinning, General Jurisprudence, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, pp. 362-365; International Council on Human Rights Policy, When Legal Worlds 
Overlap: Human Rights, State and Non-State Law, 2009; F. Colom González, “Justicia Intercultural. El 
Pluralismo Jurídico y el Potencial de la Hermenéutica Normativa”, RIFP, vol. 33, 2009, pp. 7-24; ibid, 
“Entre el credo y la ley. Las minorías etno-religiosas y los fenómenos de pluralismo jurídico”, in ¿Hacia 
una sociedad post-secular?, F. Colom and A. Sala, (eds.), Fundación M. Giménez Abad, Zaragoza, 2011, 
pp. 157-178; N. Lerner, “Group Rights and Legal Pluralism”, Emory International Law Review, vol. 25, 
2011, pp. 829-851; Consejo Internacional de Políticas de Derechos Humanos, “Pluralismo Legal y 
Derechos Humanos”, available at http://www.ichrp.org/es/proyectos/135; J. Ferreiro, “La libertad 
religiosa como palanca para la integración: la Fundación Pluralismo y Convivencia” in AA.VV., 
Protección jurídica de la persona, Civitas, 2010, pp. 205-253; M. J. Roca, “Deberes de los poderes 
públicos para garantizar el respeto al pluralismo cultural, ideológico y religioso en el ámbito escolar” in 
Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, 17 (2008), pp.1-37 and T. 
Prieto Álvarez, Libertad religiosa y espacios públicos (Laicidad, pluralismo, símbolos), Cívitas-Thomson 
Reuters, Navarra, 2010. 
3 See his “Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective”, Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, vol. 20, 2010, p. 476. 
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we turn to the emerging field of “global legal pluralism”, the same author, in this case 
with a certain uneasiness, provides diverse references to depict it as an irrepressible tide: 
“[…] in globalization discourse much is made of the diversification of significant actors 
in international relations and international law […]; international lawyers, concerned 
about the fragmentation of their subject, point, inter alia, to the proliferation of 
supranational courts and tribunals (over 130 at a recent count), and norm creating 
agencies (such as the ILO, WTO, non-state regulatory agencies, governing bodies of 
sports such as IOC and FIFA). Related to this, scholars sometimes refer to “pluralism” 
of putative, emergent, even fantastical, supranational branches of law: global 
administrative law, internet law, lex mercatoria, lex sportiva, lex constructionis, ius 
humanitatis, lex pacificatoria. Inspired by “the new governance” there is talk of 
constitutional pluralism and plurinational democracy. And so on”4. 
Although consternation over the situation described so vividly by Twining is 
understandable, we believe that it is no less certain, in the end and in the context of 
multiculturality, that any reasonable approach towards a solution to the complex 
problems arising within this context must unquestionably be grounded on a foundation 
of legal pluralism. Outstanding scholars of the aforementioned sociology of law have 
shown this to be the case, and, we might say, this approach corresponds to the very 
nature of things, in an approach embodied in the societies referred to above5. 
Nevertheless, it is also of note that on occasions, the democratic, secular state, guarantor 
of human rights, the same state we associate with these societies, shows extreme rigour, 
especially with regard to the relations with minorities – Muslims in particular – and to 
their religious rights, within a dynamic, perhaps, of making religion invisible6. 
                                                 
4 Ibid, p. 512. There is a clear rejection in his writing of the theses of, for example, R. Michaels, cited in 
note (2), supra, and of P. S. Berman; see, on the latter, for example, “Global Legal Pluralism”, Southern 
California Law Review, vol. 80, 2007, pp. 1155-1237 and ibid, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence 
of Law Beyond Borders, L. Lavoisier, 2012. Also, in general, J. Linarelli, Reasonable Pluralism and 
International Law, at http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3 /papers.cfm?abstract_id=1834922 and S. Ferreri, 
“Complexity of Transnational Sources, General Report”, at http://isaidat. di.unito.it /index.php/isaidat/ 
article/viewFile /87/103. A very precise and illustrative point on the subject of pluralism in sport can be 
found in N. Zambrana, “Contador, ¿qué es eso del TAS?”, in Diario de Navarra, 15-XII-2011, p. 14. 
5 On the interconnection between pluralism and multiculturality, see, for example, the extensive 
bibliography reported in note (7) of our study cited in note (1), supra. For some critical appreciations in a 
very precise sphere see, M. Sharafi, “Justice in Many Rooms since Galanter: De-Romanticizing Legal 
Pluralism Through the Cultural Defense”, Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 71, 2008, pp. 139-146; 
M. J. Escrivá Ivars, “Pluralismo, multiculturalismo y objeción de conciencia en una sociedad democrática 
avanzada”, in AA.VV. (Dir. M. L. Jordan Villacampa) Multiculturalismo y Movimientos Migratorios, 
Tirant Lo Blanch, 2003, pp. 295-31 and M. L. Jordán Villacampa, “Grupos religiosos e inmigración”, 
ibid, pp. 21-81; Y. García Ruiz, “Flujos migratorios, confesiones religiosas acatólicas en la Comunidad 
Valenciana y cuestiones bioéticas”, ibid, pp.315- 334. 
6 See for example, D. Grimm, “Religion and Constitutional Adjudication: Conflicts Between General 
Laws and Religious Norms”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 30, 2009, pp. 2369-2382; R. Ballard, “Human 
Rights in Contexts of Ethnic Plurality: Always a Vehicle for Liberation?”, in Legal Practice and Cultural 
Diversity, R. Grillo et alii, (eds.), Ashgate, 2009, pp. 299-330 and C. Joppke, “The Retreat of 
Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy”, The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 55, 
2004, pp. 237-257. See, for example, the study by E. Daly, “Laïcité, Gender Equality and the Politics of 
Non-Domination”, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol. 0(0), 2012, pp. 1-32. Likewise, see, D. 
 4 
Particularly worth mentioning is, for example, the legal rigidity of constitutional 
States7, or the emergence of a new “civil religion”8. We introduce this question here, 
which we consider merits thorough research, and only comment that the supporters of 
such “religion” seem on occasions to assemble their forces against a monolithic concept 
of Islam and Sharia, a concept that, we believe, is a long way from matching reality, 
especially with regard to the minority Islamic groups settled in Western countries9. 
                                                                                                                                               
Helly, “Orientalisme Populaire et Modernisme. Une Nouvelle Rectitude Politique au Canada”, La Revue 
Tocqueville, vol. 31 (2), 2010, pp. 157-193. In support of secular constitutionalism without breaches, see, 
in contrast, for example, F. Raday, “Gender and Religion: Secular Constitutionalism Vindicated”, 
Cardozo Law Review, vol. 30, 2009, pp. 2769- 2798. Also of interest is J-C Monod, “What’s New in Our 
Current ‘International Secularism’?, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 25, 2012, pp. 67-72 ; L. 
Zucca, “Law v. Religion”, in Law, State and Religion in the New Europe, L. Zucca and C. Ungureanu, 
(eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 137-159 and V. Zwart, “The Right to Remain Religious: 
Muslim Integration on Human Rights in Post Secular Europe”, in Righting Wrongs, vol. 1, 2011, pp. 103-
110. 
7 See, for instance, C. Backenköhler, Los conflictos del pluralismo cultural y jurídico: Retos 
metodológicos ante la irrupción del Islam, at http://csic.academia.edu/Christian 
Backenkohler/Talks/49901/Los_conflictos_del_pluralismo_culturaly_juridico retos 
metodologicos_ante_la_irrupcion_del_Islam. For a general view, see, for example, D. Augenstein, 
“Religious Pluralism and National Constitutional Traditions in Europe”, in Law, State and Religion…, 
cit., pp. 261-280; S. Meseguer Velasco (coord.), single issue section “Principios constitucionales y 
libertad religiosa: cuestiones conflictivas”, Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico 
del Estado, no. 25, 2011; J. A. Souto Paz and C. Souto Galván, El Derecho de Libertad de Creencias, 
Marcial Pons, 2011; M. J. Roca, “Teoría y práctica de la laicidad”, Acerca de su contenido y su función 
jurídica”, in Persona y Derecho, no. 53, 2005, pp. 223-257; G.Suárez Pertierra, “Laicidad en el 
constitucionalismo español” in AA.VV. (D. Llamazares, coord.), Libertad de conciencia y Laicidad en 
las instituciones y servicios públicos, Dykinson, 2005, pp.119-132; J. Martínez-Torrón, (ed.), Estado y 
Religión en la Constitución Española y en la Constitución Europea, Comares, Granada, 2006; I. Martín 
Sánchez, “El modelo actual de relación entre el Estado y el factor religioso en España”, ibid, no. 16, 
2008; A. Ollero Tassara, La libertad religiosa en perspectiva constitucional, Thomson-Áranzadi, 
Navarra, 2009; R. Palomino Lozano, “Neutralidad y factor religioso: mito, principio, y significado”, in 
Aequitas sive Deus. Studi in honore di Rinaldo Bertolino, II, Giappichelli, Torino, 2011, pp. 948-971. 
 
8 See, for example, R. Hirsch and A. Sachar, “State Sovereignty and Constitutional Models for the 
Relation Between Religion and the State: The New Wall of Separation: Permitting Diversity, Restricting 
Competition”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 30, 2009, pp. 2535-2560 and A. Rivero, “La vuelta de la 
religión a la política en Europa “, in ¿Hacia una sociedad post-secular?, cit., pp. 37-57. D. Helly talks of 
ultra-laicism; see her “Formas de intolerancia religiosa en Canadá”, ibid, pp. 146-148. In general, R. 
Navarro-Valls and R. Palomino, Estado y Religión. Textos para una reflexión crítica, Ariel, Barcelona 
2000; J. Ferreiro, “State-Religion Relations in Spain: Legal and Constitutional Framework” in Legal 
Aspects of Religious Freedom, Ljubljana 2008, pp. 458-469; G. Morán Comunidad Política y Religiosa. 
Claves de la Cultura Jurídica Europea, vol.1, ed. Netbiblo, 2008; I. C. Ibán, “State and Church in Spain”, 
in G. Robbers (ed.), State and Church in the European Union, Second Edition, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 
2005, pp.139-155. 
9 These are an archetype of what A. Sachar, following R. Corver, calls nomoi groups; see her 
Multicultural Jurisdictions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 2 and therein, note (5). 
With particular reference to the United Kingdom, see, for example, P. Shah, “Between God and the 
Sultana? Legal Pluralism in the British Muslim Diaspora”, in Sharia as Discourse, J. S. Nielsen and L. 
Christoffersen, (eds.), Ashgate, Surrey, 2010, pp. 117-139; I. Yilmaz, “Law as Chameleon: The 
Incorporation of Muslim Personal Law into the English Law”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 
21, 2001, pp. 297-308; idem, “Marriage Solemnization among Turks in Britain: The Emergence of a 
Hybrid Anglo-Muslim Law”, ibid, vol. 24, 2004, pp. 57-66 and idem, “Muslim Law in Britain: 
Reflections in the Socio-Legal Sphere and Differential Legal Treatment”, ibid, vol. 20, 2000, pp. 353-
360. M. Rohe states, “(…) in England, […] an ‘angrezi shariat’ (English sharia) is obviously 
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These points bring the present section to a close. In the following two sections, we 
attempt to illustrate the influence of pluralism and the acceptance of non-state religious 
legal systems with regard to both domestic – or substantive – law (II), and private 
international law systems (III). In keeping with the summary style of this paper, we 
explore these questions below from Western legal system viewpoint, and bring the 
paper to a close with some brief conclusions in section (IV). 
II. PLURALISM IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
In this and the following section we use examples to show how the Western 
systems we have taken as our vantage point tackle the solution of what A. Borrás rightly 
calls “hidden conflicts”10 in multicultural settings. 
                                                                                                                                               
developing”; see his Alternative Dispute Resolution in Europe Under The Auspices of Religious Norms, 
RELIGARE W. P. No. 6/January 2011, p. 5. See also, in general, A. Yousif, “Islam, Minorities and 
Religious Freedom: A Challenge to Modern Theory of Pluralism”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 
vol. 20, 2000, pp. 29-41; A. El-Azhary Sonbol, “The Genesis of Family Law: How Shari’ah, Custom and 
Colonial Laws Influenced the Development of Personal Status Codes”, in Wanted, Equality and Justice in 
the Muslim Family, Musawah, 2009, pp. 179-207; K. A. El Fadl, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: 
The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth 
Centuries”, Islamic Law and Society, vol. 1, 1994, pp. 141-187; S.A. Mallech, “A Contextual Reading of 
Shari’a in the Qur’an: Implications for Contemporary Western Societies”, Journal of Islamic Law and 
Culture, vol. 11, 2009, pp. 1-12 ; A. Hussain, “Muslims, Pluralism and the Interfaith Dialogue”, in 
Progressive Muslims, O. Safi, (ed.), Oneworld, 2008, pp. 251-286 and C. Bottici and B. Challand, “Islam 
and the Public Sphere: Public Reason or Public Imagination?”, in Law, State and Religion…, cit., pp. 
115-133. Among other interesting approaches, see also, for example, J.A. Souto Paz, “Multiculturalismo, 
inmigración y libertad religiosa”, in C. V. Zambrano (coord.), Pluralismo religioso y libertad de 
conciencia: Configuraciones jurídicas y políticas en la contemporaneidad, 2003, pp.29-44; AA.VV., M. 
L. Jordán Villacampa, (dir.), Multiculturalismo y movimientos migratorios, TLB, Valencia, 2003; 
Rodríguez Benot, “El estatuto personal de los extranjeros procedentes de países musulmanes”, in Derecho 
Islámico e Interculturalidad, Iustel, 2011, pp. 89-110; M. Rohe, “Shari’a in a European Context”, in 
Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, R. Grillo, et alii, (eds.), Ashgate, Surrey, 2009, pp. 93-113; L. 
Christoffersen, “Is Shari’a Law, Religion or a Combination? European Legal Discourses on Shari’a”, in 
Shari’a as Discourse, cit., pp. 57-75; M. L. Movsesian, “Fiqh and Canons: Reflections on Islamic and 
Christian Jurisprudence”, Seton Hall Law Review, vol. 40, 2010, pp. 861-888 ; V. Sisler, “Cyber 
Counsellors”, Information, Communication and Society, 2011, pp. 1-24 ; M. Kohn, “Western Imperialism 
and Islamic Law”, in Law Without Nations, A. Sarat, et alii, (eds.), Stanford Law Books, Stanford, 2011, 
pp. 138-156 and M. Roca, “¿ La Sharía como ley aplicable en virtud de libertad religiosa?”, in Derecho 
Islámico e Internacional, P. Diago et alii, (eds.), 2011, pp. 45-87. On personal law systems and references 
to Muslim law, see also, for example J. A. Redding, “Dignity, Legal Pluralism and Same-Sex Marriage”, 
Brooklyn Law Review, vol. 75, 2010, pp. 825-832. A particularly good example of the adaptive capacity 
of Sharia is found in Israel; see, for example, Y. Reiter, “Judge Reform: Facilitating Divorce by Shari’a 
Courts in Israel”, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, vol. 11, 2009, pp. 13-38. The reform of the 
Moroccan Family Code, Moudawana, of special importance from a Spanish perspective for obvious 
reasons, is also a significant development; for various key aspects, see, for example, M-C Foblets, 
“Moroccan Women in Europe: Bargaining for Autonomy”, Washington and Lee Law Review, vol. 64, 
2007, pp. 1385-1415. In reference to Italy, see, for example, E. Pföstl, “Muslim Women Between Secular 
State and Religion”, International Review of Sociology, 2012, pp. 1-12, iFirst article.  
10 Graphic expression by this renowned author, which we believe could also alert us to the primarily 
indirect and fragmentary way in which these systems attempt to channel such questions; see her “Europa: 
entre la integración y la multiculturalidad”, in Derecho islámico e interculturalidad, AA.VV., IUSTEL, 
2011, p. 25 onwards. 
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 Of prime interest in this section is the question of marriage in some regulations 
that come under the label of pluralism in the USA and the United Kingdom. In the 
USA, what are known as covenant marriages are one of the legal forms of marriage 
recognised under the laws of some states. However, it should be pointed out that in 
reality, they constitute a kind of reinforced marriage, indicative of the emergence in the 
USA of dual marriage systems, as indicated in the doctrine on these covenant 
marriages11. We refer readers to this doctrine, and to our own analysis of the question12. 
 Some USA state laws notably establish unique systems for the celebration of 
marriage. This is the case, for example, of the New York regulation which requires that 
the parties “must solemnly declare […] that they take each other as husband and wife”, 
but also states that this requirement “shall not affect marriages among the people called 
Friends or Quakers; nor marriages among the people of any other denominations having 
as such any particular mode of solemnizing marriages”13. A Rhode Island law allows 
Jews to marry “within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their 
religion”, even if State law otherwise prohibits such marriages14. These prescriptions by 
US legislators are, in our view, significant, as are the provisions for Jews and Quakers 
in the United Kingdom dating back to Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act (1753), which 
have survived subsequent marriage law reforms15. A further piece of UK legislation 
worthy of mention is the Marriage (Registration of Buildings) Act of 1990, a symbol of 
the gradual official recognition of the new ethnic minorities settled in the United 
Kingdom, such as Sikhs, in that it allows civil and religious marriage ceremonies to be 
held in the same building, thereby removing the problems that arose prior to its 
approval16. 
                                                 
11 On this question, see the in-depth study by L. Martínez Vázquez de Castro, El concepto de matrimonio 
en el Código civil, Thomson, 2008, particularly pp.150-156. 
12 See, for example, J. A. Nichols, “Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New York and 
Louisiana to the International Community”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 40, 2007, pp. 
148-153; our contribution can be found in section 2.2 of the publication cited in note (1), supra. 
13 N.Y. DOM. REL. Law, Sect. 12; in addition, A. Laquer Estin notes that the UNIFORM MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE ACT, Sect. 206, 9A U. L.A.182 (1998), allows the solemnisation of marriage “in 
accordance with any mode of solemnization recognised by any religious denomination, Indian Nation or 
Tribe, or Native Group”; see her “Unofficial Family Law”, Iowa Law Review, vol. 94, 2009, p. 457, and 
note (27) therein. 
14 R.I. GEN. LAWS Sect. 15 1-4 (2003), reported by A. Laquer Estin, op. cit., p. 457 and note (28) 
therein. 
15 See, for example, I. Yilmaz, “Muslim Law in Britain: Reflections in the Socio-legal Sphere and 
Differential Treatment”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 20, 2000, p. 355. 
16 In Kaur v. Singh, 1 All E. R. 1972, p. 292, the court held that Sikh practice and religion require that for 
a marriage to be valid, the civil ceremony must be held in an officially recognised building, and the 
religious ceremony in a Sikh temple; see I. Yilmaz, ibid. 
 7 
 Polygamous marriage has also generated diverse responses at a comparative 
level; we present three examples that incline towards the substantive method among 
those for regulating external legal transactions. The first of these concerns Section 34 
(2) of the German Social Security Systems Law, which provides for pro rata payment of 
pensions to widows of polygamous marriages contracted abroad17. The second example 
comes from the United Kingdom, and revokes the classic Hyde v Hyde precedent by 
recognising polygamous marriages contracted abroad and opening up all legal channels 
on matrimonial matters to interested parties, regardless of their potential or de facto 
polygamous nature. The law in question is the Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous 
Marriages Act) of 197318. The third example comes from Spain, and concerns family 
reunification in polygamous marriages, and the interesting doctrinal attention opened up 
by Organic Law 4/2000, of 11 January, article 1719. 
 Important normative data are also available on the question of divorce, such as 
when a husband is reluctant to or refuses to grant his wife the get or Jewish divorce 
document, thus leaving her in a situation of agunah – literally ‘chained’ or ‘anchored’ – 
in the eyes of her faith and community, even if she obtains a civil divorce. In contrast, 
the recalcitrant husband faces no serious problems if he obtains a civil divorce and 
remarries. This particular situation – which in situations of conflict may lead to the 
husband exerting pressure on the wife over, for instance, financial agreements included 
in the divorce procedure – has been dealt with by New York legislators in several laws, 
such as that of 1992, or by the UK government through the 2002 Divorce Act (Religious 
Marriages), designed to improve the wife’s position. We have dealt with this question 
                                                 
17 See J. Cesari, “Shari’a and the Future of Secular Europe”, in Muslims in the West After 9/11, J. Cesari, 
(ed.), Routledge, 2010, p. 153. 
18 Ibid, p. 154.  
19 See, for example, C. Vaquero, “El Harem desde Occidente: La protección de la mujer en el sistema 
español de DIPr”, in Conflictos Actuales en el mundo árabe e islámico, Cursos de Derechos Humanos de 
Donostia- San Sebastián, vol. IX, 2008, pp. 41-43. A precedent of Spanish doctrine on polygamous 
marriages, seen from the view of external legal transactions law can be found in, for example, F. J. 
Zamora Cabot, “El Derecho internacional privado ante el matrimonio poligámico: experiencias francesa y 
británica y su eventual repercusión en España”, Revista de Derecho Privado, 1982, pp. 111-124. See also, 
for example, I. García Rodríguez, “La celebración del matrimonio en una sociedad multicultural: formas e 
jus connubi (especial referencia a la poligamia)”, in Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial, vol. VIII, 2002, pp. 
145-220 and M. L. Labaca Zabala, “El matrimonio polígamo islámico y su repercusión en el Derecho 
español”, in Revista Jurídica de Castilla León, no. 18, 2009, pp.261-330. See also M. E. Olmos, 
“Matrimonio, Mujer e Islam”, in Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol.24, 2008, pp.493-523; 
M. Alenda Salinas, “Derecho de familia en un país de inmigración: entre el desconocimiento y la 
normalidad del instituto matrimonial islámico en España”, in Actas del IX Congreso Internacional de 
Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado. Derecho de Familia y libertad de conciencia en la Unión Europea y el 
Derecho Comparado, Servicio editorial del Universidad del País Vasco, 2001, pp.299-315. 
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elsewhere20, but it should be noted here however that problems remain in practice with 
regard to the UK law, while in the New York case, cooperation between civil and 
religious authorities has been encouraged through what M. J. Broyde graphically and 
astutely describes as an “invisible dance”21. 
 A further example of particular relevance within the legal pluralism debate refers 
to youth custody and the way the Dutch government has dealt with the Islamic 
institution of kafala, a guardian or fostering system that has been profusely and 
thoroughly examined in Spanish doctrine22. The guardian of the kafala, the kafil, 
commits to care for minors from other families, protecting them and ensuring their 
needs and education are provided for, without the natural parents losing rights to 
custody over them. According to P. Diago, it is “[…] an institution closely linked to the 
traditional social values that govern Islamic society in general, and specifically its 
religious values”23; Diago also notes that the care of homeless children is contemplated 
in the Koran (bear in mind that Muhammad himself was an orphan), and under Sharia 
law numerous children’s rights have been recognised for over fourteen centuries24. The 
practical application of the Dutch General Child Benefit Act – Algemene 
kinderbijslagwet – managed by the Social Insurance Bank, however, has obliged certain 
changes in the Bank’s policy, which initially refused benefits to the guardians of the 
kafala, since, as mentioned above, custody rights remained with the children’s natural 
parents. In 2001, the Bank established new lines of action that entitled the kafala 
guardians to apply for these benefits, provided they bring the children up as their own25, 
which fully complies with the nature of the kafala contract as set out, for example, in 
the Algerian Family Code, Art. 116, “the commitment to take voluntary responsibility 
for the maintenance, education and protection of the minor child in the same way a 
father would for his son” or the Moroccan Kafala Law No. 15-01, covering abandoned 
children who must be protected “in the same way a father would for his son”26. The 
Bank’s new policy, in turn, following a legal report, led to an official ruling by the State 
                                                 
20 See our publication cited in note (1), supra, sections 2.2 and 3.1. 
21 See his “New York’s Regulation of Jewish Marriage: Covenant, Contract or Statute’”, in Marriage and 
Divorce in a Multicultural Context: Multi-Tiered Marriage and the Boundaries of Civil Law and 
Religion, J. A. Nichols, (ed.), Cambridge, University Press, 2012, p. 159. 
22 See, for example, P. Diago, “La kafala islámica en España”, in Derecho Islámico e Interculturalidad, 
cit., pp. 11-159. 
23 Ibid, p. 114. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See A. J. Hoekema, “Does the Dutch Judiciary Pluralize Domestic Law?”, in Legal Practice and 
Cultural Diversity, cited in note (6), supra, p. 181. 
26 See P. Diago, op. cit., p. 114. 
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Secretary of Social Affairs in 2002 to expand the notion of foster parents and was 
appropriately codified into the regulations27. As stated above, we consider this example 
to be particularly relevant, not only because it accommodated the institution of kafala, 
but the way this was carried out: the kafala contract itself was not admitted as such, but 
rather, the regulations in force were adapted to accommodate it. As W. Menski 
observes, the kafala was “smuggled” into English law in 2002, through a new concept 
of “special guardianship”28. We will return to these developments in our conclusions. 
 We conclude the present section with a brief mention of some regulations we 
consider to be of interest. These include legislation on the ritual slaughter of animals for 
human consumption in the United Kingdom, regulated under Sec. 1 (2) of the Slaughter 
of Poultry Act of 1967, or Sec. 36 (3) of the Slaughterhouses Act of 1979, permitting the 
slaughter of poultry and other animals in abattoirs according to Jewish and Muslim 
traditional methods; or in the case of Spain, provisions made for the same traditions in 
Art. 14. 3, of the Cooperation Agreement with the Federation of Israelite Communities 
in Spain, or in Art. 14. 3, of the Cooperation Agreement with the Islamic Commission 
of Spain29. 
 Burial arrangements can also be significant; for instance, the provisions 
contained in Art. 2.6 of the above-mentioned Agreement with the Federation of Israelite 
Communities, or Art. 2.5 of the Agreement with the Islamic Commission of Spain. The 
latter recognises the right to transfer the remains of deceased Muslims, subject to the 
provisions of local government legislation and health regulations. Finally, Muslim 
burial ceremonies are exempt from provisions established by Dutch law30. 
 In the comparative field, there are many regulations similar to the ones 
mentioned above, some of which may even appear somewhat quaint or eccentric, such 
                                                 
27 See P. Hoekema, op. cit., p. 181. 
28 See his “Law, State and Culture: How Countries Accommodate Religious, Cultural and Ethnic 
Diversity”, in Cultural Diversity and the Law, M. C. Foblets, et alii, (eds.), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2010, p. 
442. Menski also refers to the way the 2003 Finance Act “very likely” incorporated the Islamic rejection 
of riba, or usury transactions, through new, cleverly disguised provisions.  
29 In both cases, compliance with current state legislation is established. Both agreements set out in their 
Articles 14. 1 and 2, respectively, the protection of the denominations kosher, and its variations, and halal 
to distinguish food prepared in accordance with their respective traditions. See, on this subject, M. J. 
Redondo Andrés, A. I. Ribes Suriol, “Análisis descriptivo de las minorías religiosas establecidas en la 
Comunidad Valenciana: Creencias, régimen jurídico confesional y tradiciones”, in Multiculturalismo y 
Movimientos Migratorios, op.cit., pp.143-170. 
30 See A. J. Hoekema and W. M. Van Rossum, “Empirical Conflict Rules in Dutch Legal Cases of 
Cultural Diversity”, in Cultural Diversity and the Law, cit., p. 859; in general see M. Rodríguez Blanco, 
“Libertad religiosa y cementerios (primeras aproximaciones)”, in Revista General de Derecho Canónico y 
Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado, vol.19, 2009, pp. 1-23; J. Bonet Navarro, “Los lugares de culto de las 
minorías religiosas en la Comunidad Valenciana”, in Multiculturalismo y Movimientos Migratorios, op, 
cit., pp. 273-282. 
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as Sec. 1 of the United Kingdom Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) 
Act  of 1976, which amended the 1972 Road Traffic Act to grant Sikhs exemption from 
wearing a helmet when riding a motor-cycle if a turban is worn; or the exemption 
included in the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, allowing swords or daggers to be carried 
in public places for religious reasons, a provision that also affects the Sikh community; 
however, these regulations are far from banal. Both these rules and those affecting more 
substantial questions are clear examples of legal pluralism and respect towards minority 
groups, who perceive support and protection for their rights and deep convictions. 
III. PLURALISM IN EXTERNAL LEGAL TRANSACTION REGULATIONS 
 Private international law systems, as would be expected, are frequently set in 
motion in multicultural contexts. Whether or not the practice derived from them is fully 
satisfactory is another question, which falls beyond the scope of this paper. Some 
relevant doctrine has advanced an opinion that is beginning to spread, that the aforesaid 
practice is causing malfunctions, and reveals certain shortcomings that may well require 
a thorough review of structural approaches and technical solutions31. Taking that into 
account, however, and for the purposes of the present contribution, in the following 
sections we briefly consider some examples of both domestic and international 
regulations, to complete the aspects of pluralism in substantive law outlined above from 
the perspective of private international law.  
1. State regulations 
 In this area, we provide just two examples, referring to divorce and repudiation, 
respectively. The former, highlighted by Prof. A. Borrás32, corresponds to Art. 107, 
section. 2 c) of the Spanish Civil Code, in which the application of Spanish law is 
provided for: “if the laws mentioned in the first paragraph of this section should not 
acknowledge separation or divorce, or should do it in a manner which is discriminatory 
or contrary to public policy”, a prevision added to the original article under Organic 
Law 11/2003, of 29 September, on specific measures for issues of public safety, 
domestic violence and the integration of foreigners (B.O.E. 30-IX-2003). However, 
                                                 
31 See, for example, on the study of problems based on everyday practice, P. Shah, “Transnational Family 
Relations in Migration Contexts: British Variations on European Themes”, RELIGARE Working Paper 
No. 7, March 2011, 19 pp. and A. J. Hoekema and W. M. Van Rossum, op. cit., pass. Free will may be a 
good card to play in this context. See, for example, A. Borrás, op. cit., p. 39 and D. J. Vicente Blanco, “La 
ley aplicable al estatuto personal de los extranjeros: de las soluciones domésticas de política migratoria a 
la necesidad de una aproximación antropológica”, in Crisis e Inmigración, TLB, Valencia, (forthcoming), 
pp. 151-153. 
32 See op. cit., p. 36. Here we do not enter into the impact of Regulation 1259/2010, on the law applicable 
to separation and divorce, DO L343, of 29 December, 2010 (Rome III). 
 11 
what may in principle be regarded as a general precept, in its foundations demonstrates 
its multicultural tenet, in the Statement of Reasons, (IV, 4º), of this Organic Law, that 
indicates the modification is “to solve the problems facing certain foreign women, 
fundamentally of Muslim origin, who apply for separation or divorce” (our italics). We 
understand that this point is in tune with legal pluralism in the axiological perspective, 
that of its core values, by attempting to protect, in this case, a particular segment of a 
significant minority in Spain, even though doing so involves bypassing application of 
the laws of their original country33. 
 On the question of repudiation, we now turn to Article 57 of the Belgian Code of 
Private International Law, of July 2004. Experts such as Professors J. Erauw and M. 
Fallon were closely involved in the drafting of the Code, and it was precisely Article 57 
that proved most controversial during its passage through the Belgian Senate. The Code 
states, “Article 57 sets out the principle that a talaq is not recognized in Belgium unless 
the woman and the man have equal right to divorce. A talaq is only recognized in 
Belgium under very strict conditions, inter alia that the wife has unequivocally accepted 
the dissolution of the marriage”34. Against a background of great misgiving towards 
repudiation (talaq), in our view what is noteworthy is that this Islamic institution is 
accepted, although under strict conditions, once again demonstrating pluralism, here in 
the recognition of decisions. It should be pointed out, for instance, that Sharia does 
allow divorce – khula – on the woman’s petition, and is usually negotiated with her 
mahr (dowry), and we therefore conclude that the possibility of it being recognised in 
Belgium, even in the strict terms provided in article 57, is indeed a real possibility35. 
2. International regulations 
We begin this section with a reference to bilateral agreements as a qualified 
means to tackle the particular challenges of multiculturality in European systems. This 
is the case, for instance, of countries like Belgium or France that, in accordance with the 
North African origins of their Muslim minorities, have signed various international 
agreements, as has Spain with its neighbour Morocco, in significant areas such as legal 
                                                 
33 In general, see, N. Marchal Escalona, “Nulidad, separación y divorcio de la mujer marroquí en 
España”, in Instituto Andaluz de la Mujer, La situación jurídico familiar de la mujer marroquí en 
España, Estudios no. 25, 2008, pp.219-244. We believe article 10 of the Rome III Regulation is 
consistent with the approach of Article 107 section 2, c) of the Spanish Civil Code.  
34 See, for example, comments by J. Cesari, op. cit., in note (17), supra, p. 160.  
35 A possibility that has materialised in Spain, for example, in various Supreme Court of Justice decisions, 
such as the Writ of 8 June 1999, RAJ 1999/ 4346; Writ of 27-1-98, RAJ 1998/2924 and Writ of 21-4-98 
RAJ 1998/3536. See, in general H. Zekri, “La disolución del vínculo matrimonial en las relaciones 
bilaterales Hispano-Marroquíes”, in La situación jurídico familiar…, op. cit., pp.245-268. 
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cooperation in civil, commercial and administrative matters, or on the rights of custody, 
visits and return of minors36. Some examples of multilateral agreements are remarkable 
like, within the 1996 Hague Convention on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, 
enforcement and co-operation in respect of parental responsibility and measures for the 
protection of children37, its Art. 33(1), covering kafala38. From a Spanish perspective 
also, it is worth of mention that Spain and Morocco are signatories to the 1980 Hague 
Convention on civil aspects of international child abduction39, although this text was not 
conceived specifically for the multicultural context, nor do its provisions cover aspects 
from that setting. The continued validity of international cooperation as a tool of great 
interest with regard to the contexts studied in this paper and the solution of questions 
arising within them should, however be noted40. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 Throughout this paper we have provided some examples that illustrate how 
Western democracies are including in their regulations the reflections of legal pluralism 
referred to in our title. However, although our endeavour is not, nor can be, exhaustive, 
we are left with a feeling of fragmentation, a lack of systemisation, and perhaps some 
opportunism in legislators’ responses. We have also referred to hidden conflicts, 
invisible dances and invisibility in religious matters,  and to Islamic institutions 
smuggled into the regulatory fabric of a defined country. Similarly, we might use the 
expression asymmetric pluralism, now coined in the doctrine, to refer, for example, to 
the way some institutions with origins in a particular confession are regulated, while 
other similar or identical institutions from different faiths sink into oblivion. To our 
mind, therefore, the States we refer to do show a certain pluralism, but through indirect 
channels, in the shadows, it might be said, in a very timid way and without a firm 
conviction. The adage “The best doctor, the sun; the best police, the light” could 
provide a guideline for action that would tackle the often difficult regulation of 
                                                 
36 See, BOE (Official State Bulletin) of 25 June 1997 and BOE of 24 June 1997, respectively. Also, A. 
Borrás, op. cit., pp. 28 onwards.  
37 See, BOE 2 December 2010. 
38 See, for example, comments by A. Borrás, op. cit., pp. 29-31. 
39 See, BOE 24 August 1987. 
40 In general, see, for example, M. P. Diago, “Cooperación jurídica como instrumento para el diálogo de 
culturas ante el conflicto de diferentes concepciones familiares”, in El discurso civilizador en Derecho 
internacional. 5 comentarios y tres estudios, Y. Gamarra (coord.), Institución Fernando el Católico, 
Zaragoza, 2012, pp. 157-164; J.Mª Contreras Mazario, Las Naciones Unidas y la protección de las 
minorías religiosas, Tirant Lo Blanch, 2004 and R. M. Ramírez Navalón, “Protección de las minorías 
religiosas en el Derecho internacional: La Declaración de Naciones Unidas y el Convenio Marco del 
Consejo de Europa”, in Multiculturalismo y Movimientos Migratorios, op. cit., pp. 82-110. 
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coexistence between majority and minority groups through open dialogue, internally 
within and among groups, a dialogue that would entail a corresponding transfer to the 
legislative sphere. The times we are witnessing now offer no margin for delay in 
achieving what has to be done; those of us living through these times increasingly 
remember another period that an eminently qualified voice denounced “with burning 
concern” – mit brennender Sorge. Such times should never have come to pass, and must 
never be allowed to return41. 
                                                 
41 We should not avert our gaze - Pius XI in his celebrated Encyclical of 1937, to which we allude here, 
did not – in the face of the current rise of populism, racism, xenophobia, the “old historical demons”, that 
in the end, sowed the seeds for the destruction of our continent and to which, for example, J. Ramoneda 
alludes with his customary brilliance; see, “La decadencia europea”, El País, Thursday 23-II-2012, p. 19. 
